Binance customers withdrew $3.64bn (£2.72bn) from the exchange when it reopened on Sunday, a little over 2% of the $171bn of assets it manages. That figure is striking, but it is not the most important detail in the report. The more troubling point is how a single compromised laptop belonging to an engineer, according to Binance's early checks, could open a path to unauthorised transactions across a platform holding enormous sums for hundreds of millions of registered users.

The attack, which affected $6.3bn in digital assets, has been attributed by the FBI and others to North Korea, specifically a group known as TraderTraitor or the Lazarus Group. The same group is said to have stolen $1.5bn from Bybit in 2025. When a state-linked cybercrime operation can repeatedly target large exchanges, the industry cannot treat security as a back-office cost that gets reviewed after something goes wrong.

Binance says it has covered around 95% of the stolen assets, using its corporate treasury as well as futures insurance and emergency reserve funds, and that it will fully cover the financial impact. That commitment is welcome. But customers should not have to rely on the goodwill of a company to recover funds lost through its own security failure. The report does not say how the remaining 5% will be sourced or how long it will take, and that uncertainty deserves more scrutiny than a reassuring statement.

The FBI's publication of wallet addresses linked to the group and its call for industry partners to block related transactions is a useful step. Still, it depends on exchanges and token issuers acting quickly and consistently. Binance also said withdrawals are resuming in phases once security checks are complete, which suggests the company is still working out how exposed its systems were.

What should happen next is clear. Exchanges holding customer assets should be required to publish independent security audits, disclose how their staff devices and access privileges are protected, and explain plainly what compensation arrangements exist if they fail. Regulators should not wait for the next record-breaking breach to set those standards.